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Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Plaintiff/Appellant 
CITICORP MORTGAGE, INC., submits the following Reply Brief in the above-entitled 
matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The filing of a Bankruptcy petition by Hardy stayed any action by Citicorp to proceed 
with its non judicial foreclosure action. When relief from the automatic stay was granted, 
Citicorp was permitted to go forward and foreclose on property owned by Hardy but the 
right to pursue a deficiency continued to be stayed. When Hardy was denied a discharge 
on May 15, 1989, pursuant to U.C.A. Section 57-1-32 and U.C.A. Section 78-12-41, Citicorp 
had three months within which to commence its deficiency action. Since its Complaint was 
filed on June 27, 1989, the dismissal of the Complaint was improper. 
POINT II. 
Citicorp was under no obligation to file a Proof of Claim in Hardy's bankruptcy and 
Hardy had no right to any notice of Citicorp's intention to seek a deficiency action, 
especially since the bankruptcy was filed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and it 
was listed as a "No Asset" case. Notice of the Petition specifically stated that no "Proofs of 
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Claim" should be filed and no further direction from the Bankruptcy Court was ever given 
to Plaintiff/Appellant directing that claims could be filed. 
POINT III. 
Hardy had as much knowledge as any borrower is awarded under Utah law that there 
was a possibility of a deficiency claim. The argument that Citicorp could or should have 
filed a Proof of Claim with the Bankruptcy Court is completely irrelevant. 
POINT IV, 
Hardy is not entitled to be awarded attorneys fees and costs incurred herein. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
U.S.C A. SECTION 108(c) ALLOWS FOR THE TIME PERIOD 
TO FILE A DEFICIENCY ACTION TO BE DETERMINED BY 
UTAH LAW. UNDER U.CA. SECTION 78-12-41 AND U.CA 
SECTION 57-1-32, CITICORP HAD THREE MONTHS TO 
FILE THE COMPLAINT AFTER THE DISMISSAL OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY ACTION. 
Defendant/Appellee correctly identifies the issue at hand as to whether or not the 
three month limitation period under U.CA. Section 78-12-41 was "suspended" or continued 
to run during the period of the Bankruptcy Stay. Defendant/Appellee cites 2 Collier on 
Bankruptcy, 108.04 (15th Ed. 1991) for authority to justify his argument. However, said 
authority clearly states the following on page 108-14: 
"In some jurisdictions sate law may dictate suspension of a statute of 
limitations when a bankruptcy or another court proceeding has stayed the 
initiation of an action. Such suspensions would presumably be included within 
the terms of section 108(c), adding the entire duration of the automatic stay 
to the applicable time period." 
This is exactly what Utah law does under U.CA. Section 78-12-41. Citicorp was 
prevented from initiating a deficiency action during the time of the automatic stay. The 
code states that: 
"When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory 
prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." 
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U.S.C.A. Section 108(c) specifically provides that 
, f
. . . such period does not expire until the later of -
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period 
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or 
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay 
under section 362, 722, 1201, or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with 
respect to such claim. 
Clearly, the later of 108(c)(1) or 108(c)(2) is the three month time period allowed 
under U.C.A. Section 57-1-32. 
The case of Ross Wilkey, Trustee v. Union Bank & Trust Company, et al, (In re Baird), 
63 Bankr. 60 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 1986) does nothing to further Defendant/Appellee's 
argument. In that case the Cause of Action arose before the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition while in the instant case the bankruptcy petition was filed before the Cause of 
Action arose. In the case of John Morton v. National Bank of New York City (In re: 
Morton), 866 F.2d 561 (2nd Cir. 1989), 19 BCD 85, is inapplicable to this case where we 
Utah has a specific statute dictating that the time for the limitation period to begin running 
doesn't start until the stay is no longer in effect. There was nothing for Citicorp to extend 
or renew in order to preserve its right to seek a deficiency judgment. All it could do is wait 
for the stay to be lifted. Citicorp was completely barred from pursuing any type of 
collection activity until that time. 
The hypothetical propounded by Defendant/Appellee is inappropriate and inaccurate. 
Where fraud is the cause of the dismissal of a bankruptcy, it still may be good public policy 
to allow for the allowance of longer statutes of limitations to run. Citicorp should still have 
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had three (3) months to bring its deficiency action after the termination of the Stay had that 
even occurred on October 28, 1988. The result argued for by Defendant/Appellee would 
have only occurred had there been no bankruptcy stay in effect at the time of the trustee's 
sale but if the petition had been filed afterwards. In that way, the limitation period would 
have begun running from the day of sale and Citicorp would have had the later of whatever 
three month period remained after the lift of stay or the 30 day period. 
POINT II. 
CITICORP HAD NO OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTICE 
OF ITS INTENTION TO SEEK A DEFICIENCY WITHIN 
THREE MONTHS FOLLOWING THE TRUSTEE'S SALE. 
Defendant/Appellee had filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 and it was 
listed as a "No Asset" case. The Notice of Meeting of Creditors states "Do NOT file claims 
at this time". Citicorp was never notified by the Trustee that any assets had been located 
and that claims could be filed. Had that been the case, Citicorp would have filed a claim. 
However, this issue is completely irrelevant to the case at hand. Whether or not Citicorp 
had filed a Proof of Claim has no bearing on the matter. Defendant/Appellee received the 
same notice that every other debtor receives when a deficiency action is filed, i.e., service 
of summons and complaint. Debtors always have constructive notice that there is a 
possibility of a deficiency action whenever they are foreclosed upon by a secured creditor 
and the bid at sale is less than the total amount of the indebtedness as was the case here. 
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Defendant/Appellee argues that Citicorp should have foreseen the possibility of 
denial of discharge stating that they are not uncommon. Denials of discharge may be 
common when there has been a misrepresentation to the court of an "egregious nature" as 
was the case with the Defendant/Appellee but Citicorp had no way of knowing that Hardy 
had knowingly made a false oath to the bankruptcy court such that there would be a denial 
of discharge. Defendant/Appellee's argument on this point is illogical as well as being 
irrelevant to the matter at hand. Whether or not Citicorp had filed a Proof of Claim is 
immaterial to its right to seek a deficiency judgment. 
POINT III. 
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT THE DISTRICT 
COURTS DISMISSAL BE REVERSED 
Citicorp did not discuss U.S.C.A. Section 108(c) in its brief for the simple reason that 
it is patently obvious that under that code section and U.C.A. Section 78-12-41 the limitation 
period clearly begins to run from the time the discharge was denied. There was no effort 
on the part of Citicorp to mislead the Court as alleged by Defendant/Appellee but only an 
effort to stick to the clear cut issues of the case and not waste the Court's time. The 
dismissal of Citicorp's Complaint was done by the lower Court without the opportunity for 
Citicorp to have a hearing on the issue of the statute of limitations. The Minute Entry of 
December 18, 1989 states that the case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. That 
issue was addressed in Citicorp's Response to Court's Minute Entry. Citicorp was never 
afforded the opportunity to argue its position with respect to the statute of limitations. 
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POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE SHOULD NOTBE AWARDED HIS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN THIS 
MATTER 
Citicorp did not have a fair opportunity to argue the issue of the statue of limitations 
with the trial court and since U.C.A. Section 78-12-41 clearly controls in this matter, there 
was no need to address U.S.C.A. Section 108(c) with the trial court. Citicorp did do its 
homework with respect to these issues and the result was a clear decision that U.C.A. 
Section 78-12-41 controls. Citicorp refused to withdraw its appeal because of the firm belief 
that its position is sound in this matter and to rule otherwise but be against the law, the 
cases and public policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff contends that the language contained in 108(c), taken in conjunction with 
the provisions of Sec. 78-12-41 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) make a 
good case for allowing the filing of the deficiency action after the fraud-based discharge 
denial. Further, the "notice" issue presented by the appellee has no practical relevance to 
the chapter seven liquidation bankruptcy in question, and serves only as a red herring. 
Finally, attorney's fees should not be awarded to appellee; a solidly justiciable issue has 
been presented to the Court for determination. 
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DATED this 26th day of August, 1991. 
SHAPIRO & ROBINSON 
STEVEN D. BRANTLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CITICORP MORTGAGE, INC. 
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